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Abstract
This paper develops a simple model of the gap between socially
and privately optimal bank lending when a bank has an overhang of
impaired loans, and analyzes government policies designed to close
this gap. The impaired loans have risky cash ows but observable
market values. A number of basic concepts are explicated including
the risky lending gap, the capital component and asset risk component
of the risky lending gap, capital injections versus asset purchases as
policy tools, decomposition of the e¤ects of asset purchases into loan
substitution and risk absorption e¤ects, the supply schedule of risky
lending, the no-lending trap, and a risk-capital metric for comparing
the various policy choices. The model is calibrated to match the cur-
rent Irish banking environment and some tentative policy implications
are suggested.
1 Introduction
This paper develops a simple closed-form model of the gap between socially-
optimal and bank-management-optimal commercial bank lending when a
commercial bank is su¤ering from an overhang of impaired, risky loans with
I would like to thank Douglas Diamond, Patrick Honohan, Brian OKelly and Rowena
Pecchenino for helpful comments and Daniel Molloy for research assistance.
1
observable market values. It uses the model to analyze banking interven-
tion policies designed to encourage such banks to not excessively curb new
lending.
The analytical framework described in the paper has general relevance
to banking crisis resolution, but is crafted to t the bank policy problems
currently confronted in Ireland. Compared to the situation in other countries
such as the USA, UK, and Germany, the current Irish banking crisis is notable
for its simplicity. During the 2000-2006 period, the Irish banks1 lent recklessly
to their domestic property development industry and in 2007-8 this industry
collapsed. Now these loans are greatly impaired, endangering the current and
future viability of the banks and inducing the banks to sharply curtail new
lending. Irish banks have little exposure to the credit and mortgage-related
derivatives which increase the complexity of the banking problem in other
countries.2
The US credit-liquidity crisis originated in three linked markets: the mort-
gage derivatives market, the bond repurchase market, particularly for sub-
prime bonds, and the interbank lending market. A credit-liquidity crisis in
these linked markets led to a near complete market breakdown of the mort-
gage derivatives and credit derivatives markets and the absence of tradeable
market prices. See Brunnermeier (2009), Diamond and Rajan (2009), Gorton
(2009) and Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer (2009) for analysis and discus-
sion focussed on the US environment, and Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen
(2009) for similar analysis with a European focus. Several analysts argue
that it is nearly impossible to provide meaningful market values for the com-
plex housing-related derivatives held by US, UK and German banks, since
the liquid market for these securities has collapsed; see Bebchuck (2009) re-
garding the di¢ culty of current valuation for US banksmortgage-derivative
and credit-derivative assets and Schafer and Zimmerman (2009) for similar
points regarding German bankscomplex derivative asset positions. This is
consistent with the theoretical model in Diamond and Rajan (2009) arguing
that the specialized, information-intensive analysis needed to value complex
mortgage-related derivatives led to an e¤ective closing of that market in re-
1For terminological simplicity I do not di¤erentiate between banks and building soci-
eties, which are equivalent from the perspective of my model.
2See Honohan (2009). It should be noted that the liability side of Irish banksbalance
sheets was less traditional, since they relied heavily on interbank foreign borrowing in
the Euribor market for funding of mortage and property lending; this also is discussed in
Honohan (2009).
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sponse to increased mortgage default rates. Gorton (2009) also argues that
reasonable market pricing collapsed in the mortgage derivatives market, but
places more blame on turmoil in the linked funding markets, particularly the
bond repurchase market.
The Irish banking crisis is simpler in structure, and mymodeling approach
reects this. The impaired assets of Irish banks are conventional, property-
backed development loans, many with additional recourse to the personal
and corporate assets of the borrower. Although valuation is not trivial, it
is reasonable to treat these impaired Irish bank loans as having discernable
market values. Another distinguishing feature of the Irish banking policy
problem is the tightness of Irelands sovereign borrowing constraint compared
to other developed markets.3 Any policy proposals must be weighed carefully
against other pressing demands on government cash ows and/or government
risk capital.
The model provides a simple analytical framework for understanding the
new-lending decisions of banks with a large overhang of bad loans. The model
encompasses some of the key decision variables and policy trade-o¤s facing
the Irish government in its interventionist bank policy designed to increase
bank lending. A number of basic concepts are explicated in the paper, in-
cluding the risky lending gap, the supply schedule of risky lending, capital
injections versus asset purchases as policy tools, decomposition of the e¤ects
of asset purchases into loan substitution and risk absorption e¤ects, and a
metric for comparing the various policy choices in terms of their drain on
government risk capital. It is shown that a capital injection ameliorates the
capital component of the risky lending gap without a¤ecting the asset risk
component while an asset purchase scheme has no e¤ect on the capital com-
ponent but decreases the asset risk component. I also describe the no-lending
trap of an impaired bank, which is an analytical representation of the widely
discussed "zombie bank" problem. I show the relevance of the no-lending
trap to current Irish bank intervention policies.
Section two considers the case of a healthy bank, dened as one without
an overhang of bad loans, to set the framework and provide a benchmark.
Section three considers an impaired bank dened as one with an overhang
of bad loans; minus the di¤erence between this banks lending choice and
that of an otherwise equivalent healthy bank I call the risky lending gap.
Section four analyzes government intervention policies designed to decrease
3See IMF Sta¤ (2009) and White (2009).
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or eliminate the risky lending gap. Section ve applies the key ideas from
the model to evaluate current Irish banking policy alternatives. Section six
considers various extensions and renements of the model. Section seven
summarizes the paper.
2 Socially-Optimal Lending by an Unimpaired
Bank
This section considers a healthy bankenvironment to set the framework.
The bank has book value of equity capital of B. At the beginning of the
period, bank management chooses a level of lending L (encompassing all the
various categories of bank lending such as business loans, home mortgages,
etc.). This lending is supported by the banks equity capital, plus savings
accounts to customers paying a risk-free interest rate of r0. The bank can
freely adjust the amount of saving accounts that it issues and the risk free
return stays xed at r0.
2.1 The Risky Lending Opportunity Set of the Bank
The banks lending is risky since borrowers may default on their loans. For
normal lending (property development loans will be considered later) the
bank faces a continuum of innitesimally-small loan opportunities, indexed
on the positive real line, with random returns ri; i 2 (0;1): The per-euro
random return on loan i consists of constant (across i) expected return, plus
market risk, plus lending-related non-market risk, plus loan-specic idiosyn-
cratic risk:
ri = rN + erm +  efL + "i;
where "i is mean zero, independently distributed4 across i; and none of the
other variables are loan-specic. The market factor, erm and lending-related
non-market factor, efL; are uncorrelated, zero mean random variables cap-
turing (respectively) the market-related nondiversied risk and non-market-
related nondiversied risk in the banks loan book. The idiosyncratic risks
"i are diversied away in the banks loan book. The non-market factor efL
4There are some subtle measure-theoretic di¢ culties with assuming independence of a
continuum of random variables but these can be overcome - see Judd (1985) and Du¢ e
and Sun (2004).
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impacts the risk of the banks loan book, but is diversiable risk from the
perspective of capital market investors holding well-diversied portfolios of
securities. The market beta  and factor exposure  are assumed constant
across loans; I weaken this assumption in section six below.
By assumption, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) applies to all
traded assets in the economy, including the market value of bank loans and
bank equity. I assume that the expected book value return on normal loans
equals their CAPM-required return, so that rN = r0 +  where  is the
market risk premium. This ensures that the book value of each loan equals
its fair market value.
Recall that the euro amount of lending chosen by the bank is denoted L:
The return on this lending is the integral of loan returns over the interval 0
to L :
rN =
1
L
LZ
0
ridi = rN + erm +  efL; (1)
invoking the law of large numbers and independence across "i to impose
LR
0
"idi = 0: By the denition of return, the end-of-year value of the lending
book is (1 + rN)L:
I dene the risky lending opportunity function as the relationship between
the size of the loan book L and its return volatility N = (V ar[rN ])
1
2 : In sec-
tion six below we consider nonconstant risky lending opportunity functions:
N = g(L); (2)
by allowing  and  to depend upon i: In the main part of the paper (sections
two through ve) we rely on (1),which gives constant return volatility for the
lending book, in particular:
N = (
2V ar[rm] + 
2V ar[fL])
1
2 :
2.2 Bank Equity Market Value and Return
Next I consider the determination of the market value of the banks eq-
uity. Recall that the expected return on normal bank lending is equal
to its required return rN . The market discount rate for risk-free borrow-
ing and lending is of course r0: The CAPM has the non-arbitrage property
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that the discount rate on linear combinations of CAPM-priced assets is the
value-weighted linear combination of their discount rates. It follows from
Modigliana-Miller theory that the banks lending choice has no e¤ect on its
equity market value; the bank engages in any chosen amount of zero-net-
present-value borrowing and zero-net-present-value lending, but this always
keeps it equity market value Q equal to book value B.
Let V denote the realized end-of-year value of bank equity. End of year
value of equity is the value of the loan book minus the interest cost of the
savings accounts:
V = (1 + rN)L  (1 + r0)(L B) (3)
where rN is the realized return on the loan book. Return on equity is dened
as the annual proportional increase in equity value, that is,
rQ = V=Q  1: (4)
The realized return on equity can be inferred from the chosen level of
lending and the realized return on the loan book:
V=Q  1 = r0 + (L=Q)(rN   r0): (5)
Note that for simplicity in my denitions of realized equity value and return,
equations (3) and (4), I do not allow equity shareholders to have limited lia-
bility. Unlimited liability allows the bank to issue risk-free savings accounts,
which is analytically convenient.
2.3 Modeling the Banks Lending Decision
Since in the model the bank engages in entirely zero-net-present-value lending
and borrowing, the bank cannot increase or decrease equity value through
its lending policy. Our modeling objective is to analyze the decreases in
bank lending by banks with large overhangs of impaired loans. Within this
context, it is sensible to model the bank as a risk-averse institution. The
risk-return preferences of a bank, in terms of the imputed preferences from
observable behaviour, depend upon a variety of inuences: the risk pref-
erences of bank shareholders holding underdiversied positions, managerial
incentives toward risk-taking, and the costs of nancial distress for the bank
including reputational e¤ects. For simplicity I assume that the bank owner
6
(which can be viewed as an amalgam of the various stakeholders guiding its
behaviour) has constant absolute risk aversion with risk aversion coe¢ cient
; that is:
U(rQ) = E[ exp( (1 + rQ))]
where rQ is the one-year return on bank equity.
Calculating the mean and variance of the banks realized return on equity:
E[rQ] = (L=Q)(rL   r0) + r0; (6)
V ar[rQ] = (L=Q)
22N : (7)
Both the expected return on equity (6) and its variance (7) are increasing
functions of the chosen capital ratio (L=Q) of the bank.
I assume that erm and efL are multivariate normal, so that the realized
return on lending rN is normally distributed. This simple framework of
constant absolute risk aversion and normally distributed returns has many
weaknesses but it has the convenient property that preferences can be writ-
ten in a simple linear mean-variance form. Applying the formula for the
expectation of the exponential function of a normal:
U(rQ) =  exp( E[(1 + rQ)] + 1
2
2V ar[rQ]) (8)
The left-hand-side preferences in (8) are only dened up to a monotonic
transformation and are preserved under strictly increasing monotonic trans-
formations. Taking the natural log of minus utility gives a monotonic in-
verse of preferences, and then multiplying by minus one restores the original
monotonic ordering. Dividing by  > 0 gives:
U(rQ) = E[(1 + rQ)]  1
2
V ar[rQ]); (9)
which is an observationally equivalent (but simpler) version of the same pref-
erences, restated as linear mean-variance preferences over equity return.
The bank owners problem is to choose L to maximize U(rQ). The
problem has a unique solution dened by its rst-order condition @U
(rQ)
@L
set
= 0
which becomes after simplication:
L = Q(
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
) (10)
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Figure 1 shows the optimal choice of lending by the bank. The parameters
are calibrated to give a reasonable representation (annual units, billions of
euros) for a medium-large Irish bank. In particular B = 3; r0 = 2%; rN =
3:5%; N = 5:0%; and  = :36.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Without further justication, I assume that the competitive lending choice
by an unimpaired bank is the socially-optimal level of lending.
3 The Risky Lending Gap of an Impaired Bank
Now I consider the case of an impaired bank. The bank inheritsa stock
of bad loans from earlier bad decisions and/or bad luck (a combination of
these, obviously, for the case of Irish banks circa 2009). I call these developer
loans. Although the model remains a single-period static model, I think of
the developer loans as due to decisions made sometime in "the past." Only
the remainder of the loan book is a free choice variable for the bank.
3.1 Separating Out Developer Loan Losses
No matter how impaired, the developer loans should retain some positive
expected value since some proportion of the loans may be repaid, or collateral
seized and sold for cash. Let LD denote the book value of developer loans
with random return on book value of rD. For simplicity I assume that there
has been no book-value write down of developer loan impairment, so that
LD equals the loan original issue value.
The realized return on developer loans are uncertain with expected value
rD and standard deviation D. I assume that the market discount rate on the
developer loan losses is the same as on other loans, rN . However they have
book value expected return substantially below their market value required
return (it is clear empirically that rD is negative) so that market value is sub-
stantially below book value. I assume that the returns on the developer loans
and normal loans are joint normally distributed with correlation coe¢ cient
.
Let LN denote the normal loans (all loans other than the overhang of
developer loans) with normal random return rN . As before, these loans have
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returns given by (1). The total loan book is:
L = LD + LN :
Since normal loans have zero net present value, the market value of bank
equity is equal to book value minus the discounted present value of the de-
veloper loan losses:
Q = B   LD(rN   rD
1 + rN
) (11)
The expected losses on the developer loans decrease the market value of bank
equity and increase true leverage, even if these losses are not acknowledged
in the published accrual-accounting balance sheet. A weakness of the model
is that it cannot accomodate a negative-market-value bank, LD( rN rD1+rN )  B;
since in that case equity return and bank owner risk preferences are unde-
ned.
The risky lending opportunity function remains the same as in the case of
the healthy bank. The bank is restricted to choosing LN  0 which implies
that L  LD:
3.2 Bank Equity Risk-Return and Optimal Lending
Choice
The realized end-of-year equity value of the bank is now:
V = (1 + rN)LN + (1 + rD)LD   (1 + r0)(LN + LD  B) (12)
and return on equity is:
rQ =
V
Q
  1: (13)
The expected return on equity and its standard deviation are easy to
derive from (12 ) and (13):
E[rQ] =
LN
Q
(rN   r0) + LD
Q
(rD   r0) + B
Q
r0 (14)
V ar[rQ] = (
LN
Q
)22N + (
LD
Q
)22D + 2LNLD(
ND
Q2
) (15)
There are two basic changes in equity returns relative to the case of a healthy
bank. One, the decrease in equity market value (11) causes leverage to
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increase, a¤ecting mean return linearly and return variance quadratically.
Two, the risk in the developer loan losses adds two positive terms to the
expression for return variance. If we assume that at the optimum LN > 0
then there is a unique solution to the banks preference optimization problem
dened by the rst-order condition @U
(rQ)
@LN
set
= 0. Using (9) this becomes:
@U(rQ)
@LN
=
@E[rQ]
@LN
  @V ar[rQ]
@LN
;
where @E[rQ]
@LN
= (rN r0)
Q
and:
@V ar[rQ]
@LN
= 2(
LN
Q2
)2N + 2DN(
LD
Q2
) (16)
Combining and simplifying the resulting expression for the rst-order condi-
tion gives:
LN = Q(
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)  D
N
LD (17)
subject to the inequality constraint LN  0: Adding developer lending to get
total lending gives:
L = Q(
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)  (D
N
  1)LD (18)
The case in which bank impairment is so severe that the rst-order so-
lution (18) does not obey the constraint LN  0 I call the no-lending trap.
At the margin, such a bank has no lending sensitivity to government inter-
vention e¤orts. Marginal increases in its capital or impaired asset purchases
from it will have no e¤ect on its lending policy. I will argue in section ve
that this no-lending trap has considerable policy relevance in the current
Irish context.
3.3 The Risky Lending Gap and Its Two Components
In this subsection I rst consider the case of an impaired bank that is outside
the no-lending trap, and then generalize. The di¤erence between optimal
lending of the healthy bank (10) and of the impaired bank (18) is the risky
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lending gap (RLG): Using (10) and (18) and recalling that Q = B for the
healthy bank and (11) for the impaired bank:
RLG = [B(
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)]  (19)
[(B   LD(rN   rD
1 + rN
))(
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)  (D
N
  1)LD]
The risky lending gap (19) divides naturally into two components. Com-
ponent one, called the capital component, involves recomputing RLG after
setting D = N so that developer loans have the same marginal risk as
normal loans:
capital component = fLD
B
(
rN   rD
1 + rN
)g[B( 1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)] (20)
The term in curly brackets in (20) is the proportion of book value impaired
due the expected loan losses; the proportion in square brackets is the socially-
optimal level of bank lending. The capital component of the risky lending
gap is the product of these two. The capital component captures the e¤ect
that the expected developer loan losses lower market value of equity and
increase the banks true leverage, leading it to curtail lending.
The second component I call the asset risk component; it involves setting
rD = rN so that developer loans have the same expected return as normal
loans (but higher risk). Recomputing (19) in this case:
asset risk component = (
D
N
  1)LD (21)
The high volatility of developer loans, D > N ; increase marginal asset
risk at any given level of bank lending, leading the bank to curtail lending.
Suppose now that the bank is in the no-lending trap, so that the inequality
constraint LN  0 is binding. In this case the two components dened by
(20) and (21) sum to more than the di¤erence between optimal and impaired
lending. In our application to Irish data, the capital component of the risky
lending gap is always much larger than the asset risk component, so we absorb
the inequality constraint into the capital component by subtracting from it
the di¤erence between LN = 0 and the unconstrained solution. Assuming
the inequality constraint is binding let eLN  0 denote the unconstrained
11
solution to (17). We redene the capital component as:
capital component = fLD
B
(
rN   rD
1 + rN
)g[B( 1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)]
+ eLN :
4 Alternative Policies and Their E¤ectiveness
This section considers government policies to ameliorate or eliminate the
risky lending gap, and discusses performance metrics for policy e¤ectiveness.
Where needed for clarity, I use an asterisk  to denote a variable after a policy
intervention; so for example B is the banks book value of equity without
any government intervention and B is the book value taking account of the
intervention.
As Honohan (2009) points out, policy analysis needs to distinguish be-
tween an asset purchase and a capital injection as policy tools to unfreeze
bank lending. In an asset purchase, the government purchases the banks
bad loans in exchange for cash or nancial securities. In a capital injection,
the bank issues new equity which is purchased by the government for cash.
These two pure policies can be combined: for example, the government can
purchase risky loans and also boost bank equity by purchasing new shares
issued by the bank. I consider both policies and combination policies.
I do not consider the case of a government cash subsidy, for example the
government deliberately or covertly over-paying for the risky loans as a way
to inject cash in the bank without diluting current equity holdersclaims.
Most analysts agree that any subsidy is inappropriate as a component of
contemporary Irish bank policy.
4.1 Policy E¤ects for an Unimpaired Bank
In order to establish a baseline case I rst consider the case of government
intervention in a healthy bank. This is counterfactual since there is no reason
for such intervention, but it provides baseline clarity when we examine the
more relevant case of intervention for an impaired bank.
Recall from section two the case of a healthy bank. Suppose that the
government chooses to inject G billion euros of equity capital into the bank.
The market value of bank equity capital increases to Q = B + G: This
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decreases the banks leverage ratio V
Q for any chosen value of L: This induces
the bank to increase L since the marginal increase in equity return variance
is lower for any xed L. Re-solving the banks optimal lending problem with
Q = Q+G gives, in place of (10),:
L = L+G(
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
):
Next I consider an asset purchase. The analysis is trivial. There are no
impaired loans. The bank rst chooses the optimal loan book size given by
(10). Then, the government purchases loans from the bank with book value
and market value of LG in exchange for a cash payment of LG: Next and last,
the bank re-adjusts its loan book optimally. The bank simply reinvests the
cash in additional loans and so reverts to its original optimal loan level (10).
Since the government holds loans with a book value of LG, the government
intervention has increased the total supply of loans associated with the bank
from L to L+LG: I call this induced increase in total bank-associated lending
the loan substitution e¤ect.
4.2 Capital Injections for an Impaired Bank
In this subsection I consider a capital injection of G into the impaired bank
described in section three. This has no e¤ect on the risk of the banks loan
book, but equity capital increases from Q = B   LD( rN rD1+rN ) to Q = B  
LD(
rN rD
1+rN
)+G: Inserting into (14) and (15) and re-solving for optimal lending
gives, in place of (18),:
L = [B   LD(rN   rD
1 + rN
) +G](
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)  (D
N
  1)LD: (22)
Note that a capital injection deals one-for-one with the capital component
of the risky lending gap, (20). Setting G = LD( rN rD1+rN ) eliminates the capital
component of the risky lending gap completely.
4.3 Asset Purchases and Combined Policies for an Im-
paired Bank
We assume that the government pays a fair market value for the purchased
assets, and purchases book value amount LG. The fair price for purchasing
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developer loans with book value LG is the present value of the expected cash
ows from the loans:
PV (LG) = LG
1 + rD
1 + rN
:
The haircut on the purchase refers to the proportional di¤erence between
book value and the purchase price. Given fair pricing this equals the di¤er-
ence between LG and PV (LG) as a proportion of LG: By simple algebra the
haircut equals rN rD
1+rN
:
The asset purchase crystalizes the already-lost value in the developer
loans, and mandates a write-down of the purchased loansbook value, and
consequently the book value of equity as the residual liability on the balance
sheet. The book value of equity falls by the di¤erence between the loans
book value and the fair-value cash payment:
B = B   LG rN   rD
1 + rN
(23)
The e¤ect on the market value of equity is, obviously, zero. This is be-
cause the decrease in book value is exactly o¤set by the decrease in value-
impairment associated with the purchased loans, so that Q = Q:
The di¤erence in the impact of an asset purchase on book value (23) and
market value is relevant to current policy debates in Ireland. Analysts have
cited the decline in "bank capital" as a painful consequence of any asset pur-
chase plan. Note that in the model there is no e¤ect on true market value of
equity capital from the asset purchase; it is only (badly-measured) account-
ing book value that is a¤ected. In my model, bank management-owners are
fully aware of the decline in equity capital before the asset purchase man-
dates its recognition in accounting book values. The cosmetic adjustment
in equity book value has no impact on bank behaviour in my model. Of
course this badly measured book value can have implications for regulatory
capital needs; this reveals a weakness in the regulatory regime, since it is not
a change in "true" equity capital; see Jackson, et al. (1999).
As in the case of a healthy bank, an asset purchase has a loan substitution
e¤ect, directly increasing the loans associated with the bank by LG: In the
case of the impaired bank, there is a second potentially more important
e¤ect. I will call this second e¤ect government risk absorption. The high-
variance developer loan losses are removed from the banks risk prole, which
encourages the bank to pursue a riskier lending strategy. To see this e¤ect,
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consider the loan book return variance as a function of L:
V ar(rQ) = (
LN
Q
)22N + (
LD   LG
Q
)22D + 2DN
LN(LD   LG)
Q2
(24)
Finding marginal variance by taking the derivative of (24) with respect to
LN :
@V ar(rQ)
@LN
= 22N(
LN
Q2
) + 2DN(
LD   LG
Q2
) (25)
Given that D > N , then 2DN > 22N . If this holds, then the term
 LG decreases the marginal increase in variance function (25) more than
+LN decreases it, and so increases in LG lead to increases in optimal bank
lending L = LN + LD   LG.
Inserting the new expressions for mean return and return variance into
the rst order condition for optimal normal lending, and simplifying, gives:
LN = (B   LD(
rN   rD
1 + rN
))(
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)  (D
N
)(LD   LG);
where we only consider the case LN > 0 which implies LN > 0: Adding in
the remaining developer loans to get total lending of the bank:
L = (B   LD(rN   rD
1 + rN
))(
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)  (D
N
  1)(LD   LG) (26)
hence an asset purchase has no leverage e¤ect (Q is unchanged) but deals
directly with the asset risk component of the risky lending gap, shown in
(21). Setting LG = LD eliminates the asset risk component.
Note that (26) gives the banks chosen lending book after an asset pur-
chase; there is also the loan substitution e¤ect, adding LG to total bank-
associated lending, since the government agency holds these additional loans.
Suppose that the government chooses to inject equity capital G and pur-
chase LG book value of developer loans. We denote such a combination policy
as a pair (G;LG). Taking the rst order condition for optimal normal lending
LN as above and then adding LD   LG gives:
L = [B   LD(rN   rD
1 + rN
) +G](
1

)(
rN   r0
2N
)  (D
N
  1)(LD   LG): (27)
This is the banks optimal lending; due to the loan substitution e¤ect the
total lending associated with the bank is L + LG:
15
4.4 A Metric for Policy Cost-Benet
An important policy question is which policy or combination policy o¤ers
the best cost-benet tradeo¤ for the Irish government.
This paper assumes fair-market-value transactions between the govern-
ment and bank, so they are all "costless" in terms of the governments net
loss in market value terms. However, even given that the government pays
fair market value, there is a hidden cost to these policies. In the absence of
a risky lending gap, the government would not freely choose to hold bank
shares or a portfolio of bad property loans. The government has not given
the bank a direct subsidy, but it has provided risk capital. The provision
of risk capital is the implicit cost. Policy alternatives can be compared by
examining their relative demands on Irish government risk capital.
We will describe the cash ow volatility of the governments asset position
for the two pure policies and the combination policy. The cash ow volatility
of a capital injection of G is the current market value of the position times
the volatility of equity capital return:
[var(G)]
1
2 = G[var(rQ)]
1
2 :
The cash ow volatility of an asset purchase of LG book value of the developer
loans is their book value times the volatility of their return on book value:
[var(LG)]
1
2 = LGD:
A combination policy, denoted (G;LG); has cash ow volatility:
[var(G;LG)]
1
2 = [G2var(rQ) + L
2
G
2
D + 2GLG(cov(rD; r

Q))]
1
2 ; (28)
where :
cov(rQ; rD) = (
LN
Q
)ND + (
LD   LG
Q
)2D:
Consider the policy pairs (G;LG) which set the risky lending gap equal
to zero: these pairs are dened implicity by setting (27) plus LG equal to
(10). The risk-capital-minimizing policy pair (G;LG) is the one of these
that minimizes var(G;LG): Note that there are inequality constraints on the
optimization, 0  LG  LD and G  0; so that a "pure" solution (0; LG) or
(G; 0) can be optimal.
Whether a capital injection or an asset purchase is a more appropriate
solution to the risky lending gap partly depends upon whether the gap is due
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to the expected losses on developer loans, rD, or the riskiness of these loans
in the banks loan portfolio, captured by D. If it is the expected losses
then a capital injection seems more appropriate, since the problem is then a
shortage of capital, whereas if it is due to the riskiness of the developer loans
then an asset purchase seems a more appropriate policy tool.
5 Application to Irish Bank Bailout Policies
In this section I calibrate the model to the domestic Irish banks. The nine
parameters which must be set are the risk-free rate r0; expected return on
normal loans rN ; expected return on book value for developer loans rD; book
value of bank equity B; book value of developer loans D; volatility of return
for normal loans N ; volatility of return for developer loans N ; the bank risk
aversion parameter ; and the correlation between the returns on normal
loans and developer loans : I relied on a variety of resources, including
White (2009), IMF Sta¤ Report (2009), Honohan (2009), Irish newspapers,
and informal discussions with market professionals. The parameter values
are based on my own interpretation/evaluation of these various sources.
The model has a static one-period risk horizon; I consider three versions
of the model with a risk horizon of T years, T = 1; 5; 10: For the version of
the model with a one-year horizon I set r0 = :02; rN = :035; N = :05; which
seem uncontroversial. The developer loans are given a much higher volatility,
D = :15, to reect their great degree of uncertainty: The correlation between
normal and developer loan returns is set at 0:8: To get return volatilities for
the T year horizon model I simply5 multiply the one-year values by pT : For
r0 and rN I use the equivalent T period return with annual compounding,
e.g., rT0 = (1+r
1
0)
T 1. In all cases, the risk aversion parameter  is set so that
an unimpaired bank chooses an equity capital ratio of 6%. This gives  =
0:360, 0:401, 0:460 for T = 1; 5; 10, respectively. The book value of equity for
each bank is set equal to 125% of the Tier 1 capital shown in White (2009,
Table 6). The addition of 25% equity capital to the White (2009) gures is
intended to adjust for Tier 2 capital and recent equity capital enhancement
5The "square root of time rule," as it is called, for converting shorter-term into longer-
term volalities overstates long-term volatilities in the presence of mean reversion; see Lo
and Mackinlay (1988). There are strong grounds for positing mean reversion in Irish
property asset prices over coming years, but I use the standard rule for simplicity.
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activity by the banks.6
Two critically important and di¢ cult to determine parameters are the
book value of "developer loans" (meaning the poor quality, impaired loans
at each bank) and the expected book value return on these loans. There
is little information about the distribution of developer loans across banks
and so my estimates are somewhat arbitrary. My total estimated book value
of the developer loans across the banks sums to 78 billion. This is less
than the 90 billion which has been earmarked for the Irish governments
loan purchase plan7, but that plan includes provisions for accepting some
relatively unimpaired loans8. For example it is intended to include loans for
development properties in southeast England where the property downturn
has been less severe and where there is already evidence of price recovery9;
some of these loans belong in my "normal" rather than "developer" category.
For all the banks I assume that the developer loan assets have expected
book value return over one year of  50%: The collateral for the bad-loan
portfolios of the banks mostly consists of development land, unnished con-
struction projects, completed but unsold commercial and residential real es-
tate, and completed investment properties (many with less than full occu-
pancy rates), plus personal and corporate general guarantees on the loans.
The market for development-property-related assets is distressed in Ireland
in 2009, with deep falls in market values and no immediate prospects for
recovery. There is hope among analysts that the market value of some of
the loan collateral might partially recover, if held for a su¢ ciently long pe-
riod. For the ve and ten year horizons I assume that the cumulative (not
annual) book value returns are  35% and  10%; respectively. Suppose that
the original loans had loan-to-value ratios of 80%; which is very aggressive
by traditional standards in Irish banking for this type of lending, but con-
sistent with the excesses of the boom period.10 In this case, the one-year
book value return of  50% implies that the underlying asset values will have
fallen by 60% since issuance, assigning zero value to any personal or corporate
6See Carswell (2009) for a description of some of these recent bank capital enhance-
ments, which are ongoing.
7See Taylor (2009).
8See the discussion in Whelan (2009), and the quote from government minister Mary
Harney contained therein.
9See the discussion in Quinn (2009).
10See Honohan (2009) for a discussion of irrational exuberance and over-aggressive mar-
ket share rivalry in Irish banking in the post-2000 period.
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guarantees on the loans. In order to have expected returns of  35%; 10%
over the ve-year and ten-year horizons, respectively, property asset prices
including impounded interest must increase by 30:00% (6:78% per annum
with annual compounding) during years 2-5 and 38:46% (6:72% per annum)
during years 6-10. This return includes any rental income received during the
period, impounded into the price. It still leaves property prices 28% down on
their peak values from when the developer loans were issued, including any
interest income received over the ten-year period impounded into the price.
These calculations rely on the assumption that the current book value of the
loans equals the initial loan amount; it can di¤er if the book value includes
rolled-up unpaid interest (increasing book value) or impaired loan charges
(decreasing it).
Figure 2 shows the fair-value haircuts implied by various expected book
value returns over the three horizons. For my chosen expected returns, the
1, 5, and 10 year holding periods imply haircuts of 51:69%, 45:27%, and
36:20%, respectively. The longer holding periods give lower haircuts due to
the assumption of asset price recovery.
FIGURE 2 HERE
Table 1 shows the risky lending gap of the six domestic Irish banks, using
each of the possible risk horizons (Panels A, B, and C of the table). Using
a one-year horizon, the entire banking sector is in dire straits. Three of the
banks, AIB, Anglo Irish, and Irish Nationwide, have negative equity value.
Two other banks are in the no-lending trap, which means government aid
(at least at the margin) will have no impact.
TABLE 1 HERE
Within the context of my model the negative equity value of three banks
in Panel A seems an accurate depiction of the current state of the Irish
banking sector. Only the governments unconditional guarantee on bank
liabilities, put in place in September 2008, has prevented one or more bank
failures in Ireland. Within the model, this government liability guarantee is
implicitly included in equity value as a negative-value liability.
Using a ve year horizon, Anglo Irish bank still has a negative equity
value. Even with a ten-year horizon, Anglo Irish remains insolvent. From
the perspective of the model, any government resources used to support
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Anglo Irish are wasted, since the government intervention will not generate
any new lending in the absence of a truly enormous capital injection.
For the ve and ten-year horizons, the ve solvent banks all show large
risky lending gaps. The balance of the risky lending gap between the capital
component and asset risk component is illuminating. The problem for the
Irish banks is a capital shortage rather than a too-risky loan book. Consider
the ve-year horizon. Roughly four-fths of the risky lending gap comes from
the capital component and only one-fth from the asset risk component, de-
spite upward biased11 forecasts of developer loan return volatility. According
to my model, it is the capital component not the asset risk component that
is generating the risky lending gap.
Table 1 illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of this simple the-
oretical model. The model does not give believable forecasts of bank lending
(noone believes that any of the ve solvent banks will shrink new lending to
zero) but shows succinctly the deep nature of their problem, and its source
in too-low fair market value of equity capital.
Table 2 shows three government policies which attempt to set the risky
lending gap equal to zero: two pure policies and a policy pair (G;LG). It
excludes the one-year horizon which has almost all the banks insolvent or
deep in the no-lending trap. For all ve solvent banks, the optimal govern-
ment policy is to inject equity capital rather than purchase impaired assets.
In all cases, the risk-capital-minimizing policy is a pure capital injection12,
involving a very substantial capital outlay. An asset purchase plan on its
own is insu¢ cient to eliminate the risky lending gap, but it can do so when
combined with a smaller capital injection. Comparing the market values of
equity capital in Table 1 with the proposed capital injections shown in Table
2, in all cases the capital injection implies a controlling government equity
stake (above 50%) after the policy intervention.
TABLE 2 HERE
The calibration exercise highlights the advantages of a longer risk-return
time horizon in resolving the Irish banking crisis. If an asset purchase plan
allows the government to substitute a ve or ten year risk-return perspective
in place of the banksone-year horizon, then the asset purchase plan could
11Due to mean reversion in property prices; see footnote 6 above.
12The inequality constraint LG  0 is active at the risk-capital minimizing optimum.
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add considerable economic value. One can think of the current Irish bank-
ing dilemma as a very extreme version of the standard liquidity mismatch
problem of banks (issuing short-term liabilities to fund long-term assets) as
in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Figures 3 and 4 show, for all the banks except Anglo Irish, the dependence
of the risky lending gap and its two components on the assumed values for
the expected book value return on the developer loans and on the total book
value of these loans, using the ve-year horizon. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate
the sensitivity of bank equity market value to these same two parameters for
the same horizon.
FIGURES 3-6 HERE
The model is not able to accomodate all the complications of the con-
temporary Irish bank policy problem, but it captures in a simple way some
key ideas that are important to the policy debate. In the next section I will
examine some of the limitations of the model and explore ways that it could
be extended.
6 Extensions and Limitations
6.1 Nonconstant Risky Lending Opportunity Functions
In this subsection I consider an extension of the model, allowing bank asset
return volatility to depend upon the amount of lending that the bank chooses.
To increase lending, the bank must lend to riskier borrowers. Hence the
riskiness of the loan book is a function of the magnitude of lending.
I keep the same type of loan opportunity function as in section two, but
assume that the relationship between loan i and its per-euro return volatility
di¤ers across i:
ri = rN + erm + i efL + "i (29)
where for simplicity i has the linear form
i = 0 + 1i:
Taking the integral of (29) from 0 to L gives the same expression for rN as
in (1) except for an additional term 1L: Computing the variance:
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2N = a+ bL
2 (30)
where a = 22rm + 
2
0
2
fL and b = 
2
1
2
fL:
Note that the presence of L2 in (30) gives rise to a second term in the
marginal risk function of the bank. In addition to the leverage e¤ect (more
loans means more risk per unit of equity capital) there is now a direct impact
on asset riskiness more loans means that the bank must take on riskier as-
sets. Consider the marginal risk function of the impaired bank (16) replacing
constant 2N with the function (30) in (16) and recomputing the derivative:
@V ar[rQ]
@L
= 2(
L
Q
)2N + 2(
ND
Q2
) + 2(
L
Q
)2bL+ (31)
1
2
L3(
D
NQ2
)b:
The sensitivity of bank lending to an overhang of developer loan losses is
potentially much higher in this case, reected in the extra terms and higher
powers of L in (31). In this case the sensitivity of bank lending to asset
purchase policies could be stronger than as given by (26) and (27).
As mentioned earlier I have assumed that the expected return on all loans
is the same irrespective of their level of volatility. Suppose instead that the
market risk parameter  in (29) is also a function of i: In this case both the
expected return on loans, rN ; and the required return on bank equity capital,
E[rQ]; will depend upon the banks lending policy.
My model treats the banks lending decision as a univariate choice of L,
whereas in practice banks have independent control over the risk composi-
tion of their lending books. Impaired banks, rather than or in addition to
decreasing their total lending, can shift their loan book toward lower-risk
loans.
Since loans for new business ventures and business expansion are riskier
than home mortgages and consumer lending, variation in the risk composition
of bank loan books can magnify the impact of bank impairment on jobs and
output. This has particular relevance in an open economy like Irelands.
Suppose that low-risk Irish bank loans are used to purchase holiday homes
in Spain and luxury automobiles imported from Germany; these loans will
have limited multiplier e¤ects for Irish output and employment. Suppose
high-risk Irish bank loans are used to hire additional sta¤ and expand Irish
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export businesses; these could have substantial multiplier e¤ects. Any such
loan book risk-composition e¤ects are missed by my model.
Another possible extension of the model concerns time-series dynamic
variation in the lending opportunity set, particularly variation related to the
business cycle. There are two ways to capture business cycle sensitivity in my
model. One, by assuming an upward shift in the risky lending opportunity
function (2) during business cycle contractions. Two, by making the risky
lending opportunity function (30) more steeply sloped during contractions.
In either case, the optimal level of lending falls in a contraction when banks
are most likely to have impaired loans, making the measurement of the risky
lending gap more di¢ cult.
6.2 Delegated Monitoring, Bank-Client Relationships,
Managerial Incentives
The theoretical model of this paper gives a very one-dimensional descrip-
tion of commercial banks and misses some of their essential features. A
classic view, as in Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Gorton
and Penacchi (1990), is that banks are essentially information-gathering in-
stitutions monitoring borrower quality and borrower actions. Diamond and
Rajan (2001) argue that a bank establishes mutually benecial, ongoing re-
lationships with its borrowers, and this ongoing relationship gives the bank
a ow of proprietary information about borrowers, and an enhanced abil-
ity to monitor lender behaviour and collect loan payments; see also Chan,
Greenbaum and Thakor (1986) for a related model. Kashyap, Rajan and
Stein (2002) argue that the ability and willingness to service credit lines to
existing customers is another fundamental feature of commercial banks.
These deeper theories of banking have direct relevance to the policy ques-
tions at hand. Banks must be understood as information-and-relationship
businesses, not simply asset portfolios.13 In practice, an asset purchase
scheme is not a simple transfer of the loans cash ows from the bank to
a government agency. The realized value of the loan cash ows can de-
pend upon who is managing the impaired loans and their relationship to the
borrower. Similarly, an infusion of government equity capital G can have
adverse consequences on bank incentives and behaviour, and on borrowers
13Boyd, Nicolo and Jalal (2006) make the distinction between portfolio allocation versus
optimal contracting models of banks.
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relationships with the bank. These important issues are not addressed by
my model.
6.3 Non-equity Capital Injections
I have assumed the simplest possible bank capital structure: an all-equity
rm issuing one type of savings deposit and purchasing two types of loans.
Both capital injection and asset purchase plans might be enhanced by using
more complex nancial contracts. Determining the optimal contract design
requires a more sophisticated analysis of the banking industry taking account
of agency and monitoring issues and costly proprietary information, along the
lines discussed in the previous subsection.
7 Summary
This paper is motivated by the current crisis in Irish banking. During the
global credit-liquidity bubble of 2000-2006, Irish banks lent recklessly to do-
mestic property developers. The Irish property development industry col-
lapsed during 2007-2008, and Irish banks now hold a crushing burden of
impaired property development loans. This burden has induced them to
sharply curtail new lending, worsening the recession in Ireland. The Irish
government has initiated a range of policies to encourage new lending, in-
cluding equity capital injections in the banks by the government, and the
proposed purchase by the government of some or all of the banksimpaired
loans. The paper provides a simple theoretical model to evaluate these policy
initiatives, and uses it to examine current policy choices.
The paper denes a healthy bank as one without an overhang of bad
loans, and an impaired bank as an otherwise equivalent bank with such an
overhang. The di¤erence between the chosen lending level of a healthy bank
and an impaired bank I call the risky lending gap. The risky lending gap has
two components: a capital component, reecting the decline in the market
value of bank equity associated with the overhang of bad loans, and an asset
risk component, reecting the riskiness of the bad loans and their consequent
impact on the banks marginal risk-return tradeo¤. A government equity in-
jection addresses the capital component of the risky lending gap, whereas
an asset purchase scheme addresses the asset risk component. An asset pur-
chase scheme also has a direct impact on economy-wide bank lending since
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the purchased loans are fully or partially replaced within the free-market
banking system while remaining outside that system, held on the books of a
government agency. I call this the loan-substitution e¤ect.
The model assumes subsidy-free policies so that all transactions between
the government and the impaired bank are at market value. There is still
an implicit "cost" to the policies since they absorb government risk capital.
I describe a way to measure relative cost-benet of the alternative policies
based on their absorption of government risk capital.
The model parameters are calibrated to provide some insight on the Irish
bank policy dilemma. Using a one-year risk-return horizon, the Irish banking
sector is in dire straits. Netting out the government liability guarantee, three
of the banks have negative market value. One of the remaining two banks
is incentivized to cut all new lending to zero, staying in business simply to
service its overhang of bad loans (this behaviour is what I call the no-lending
trap).
With a ve-year or ten-year horizon and an assumption of some property
asset price recovery during that period, only one bank, Anglo Irish, is insol-
vent. All ve of the solvent banks are incentivized to drastically cut normal
lending relative to an equivalent healthy bank. The risky lending gaps of the
ve banks are mostly due to the capital component rather than the asset risk
component. The problem of the Irish banks seems to be a shortage of equity
capital rather than the presence of a too-risky loan book.
The risk-capital-minimizing government policy is to use a pure capital
injection to eliminate the risky lending gap. An asset purchase plan on
its own is insu¢ cient since it leaves the banks short of capital. An asset
purchase plan plus capital injection is a feasible alternative policy to the
pure capital injection. If an asset purchase plan could serve to lengthen the
e¤ective risk-return horizon of banks, then this could serve as a major source
of value-added for the policy.
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Table 1: The Risky Lending Gap of Domestic Irish Banks 
All Units (Except Fair Value Haircut) in Billions of Euros 
One-year horizon 
Bank     Book 
Value of 
Equity 
Book Value 
of 
Developer 
Loans  
Market 
Value of 
Equity 
Total 
Lending 
Risky Lending 
Gap 
Capital 
Component of 
the Risky 
Lending Gap 
Asset Risk 
Component of 
the Risky 
Lending Gap 
Fair Value 
Haircut on 
Developer 
Loans 
Bank of Ireland 8.125 15 0.371 15* 120.417 99.417 NA 51.69% 
Allied Irish Bank 9.625 20 -0.713 NA NA NA NA 51.69% 
Anglo Irish Bank 5.875 35 -12.217 NA NA NA NA 51.69% 
Permanent TSB 2.625 4 0.557 4* 39.750 34.150 5.600 51.69% 
Irish Nationwide 1.5 3 -0.051 NA NA NA NA 51.69% 
Educational 
Building Society 
0.75 1 0.233 
 
2.485 
 
10.015 
 
8.615 
 
1.400 
 
51.69% 
*=no-lending trap, total lending equal to outstanding developer loan amount. 
Five-year horizon 
Bank     Book 
Value of 
Equity 
Book Value 
of 
Developer 
Loans  
Market 
Value of 
Equity 
Total 
Lending 
Risky Lending 
Gap 
Capital 
Component of 
the Risky 
Lending Gap 
Asset Risk 
Component of 
the Risky 
Lending Gap 
Fair Value 
Haircut on 
Developer 
Loans 
Bank of Ireland 8.125 15 1.334 15* 120.419 99.419 21.000 45.27% 
Allied Irish Bank 9.625 20 0.571 20* 140.419 112.419 28.000 45.27% 
Anglo Irish Bank 5.875 35 -9.970 NA NA NA NA 45.27% 
Permanent TSB 2.625 4 0.814 7.969 35.782 30.182 5.600 45.27% 
Irish Nationwide 1.5 3 0.142 3* 22.000 17.800 4.200 45.27% 
Educational 
Building Society 
0.75 1 0.297 
 
3.555 
 
8.945 
 
7.545 
 
1.400 
 
45.27% 
Table 2: Alternative Government Policy Interventions and their Impact 
All Units in Billions of Euros 
Five-year Horizon Capital Injection Only* Asset Purchase Only Asset Purchase Plus Capital Injection 
Bank     Capital 
Injection 
Risky 
Lending 
Gap 
Risk 
Capital 
Book Value 
Assets 
Purchased 
Risky 
Lending 
Gap 
Risk 
Capital 
Book Value 
Assets 
Purchased 
Capital 
Injection 
Risky 
Lending 
Gap 
Risk 
Capital 
Bank of Ireland 6.549 0 4.509 15 51.605 5.031 15 3.294 0 8.702 
Allied Irish Bank 8.732 0 5.194 20 68.807 6.708 20 4.391 0 11.528 
Anglo Irish Bank NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Permanent TSB 1.746 0 1.474 4 13.761 1.342 4 0.878 0 2.371 
Irish Nationwide 1.310 0 0.818 3 10.321 1.006 3 0.659 0 1.731 
Educational 
Building Society 
0.437 0 0.413 1 3.440 0.335 1 0.220 0 0.603 
*=in all cases, the pure capital injection is the risk-capital minimizing combination policy for setting the risky lending gap to zero. 
Ten-year Horizon Capital Injection Only* Asset Purchase Only Asset Purchase Plus Capital Injection 
Bank     Capital 
Injection 
Risky 
Lending 
Gap 
Risk 
Capital 
Book Value 
Assets 
Purchased 
Risky 
Lending 
Gap 
Risk 
Capital 
Book Value 
Assets 
Purchased 
Capital 
Injection 
Risky 
Lending 
Gap 
Risk 
Capital 
Bank of Ireland 7.117 0.000 6.011 15.000 60.493 7.115 15.000 3.861 0.000 12.929 
Allied Irish Bank 9.489 0.000 6.777 20.000 80.658 9.487 20.000 5.148 0.000 17.226 
Anglo Irish Bank NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Permanent TSB 1.898 0.000 2.039 4.000 16.132 1.897 4.000 1.030 0.000 3.519 
Irish Nationwide 1.423 0.000 1.073 3.000 12.099 1.423 3.000 0.772 0.000 2.581 
Educational 
Building Society 
0.474 
 
0.000 
 
0.584 
 
1.000 
 
4.033 
 
0.474 
 
1.000 
 
0.257 
 
0.000 
 
0.898 
 
 
 Notes for Figure 1:  The figure shows the risk-return opportunity set of a healthy bank 
with equity capital of 3 Billion Euros, and other parameter values as discussed in the 
text. 
  
Notes for Figure 2:  The figure uses the parameter values from the calibrated models 
for one, five and ten years, except book value return of developer loans, which is 
varied. 
 Figure 3: The risky lending gap and its components as a 
function of the expected book value return on developer 
loans 
 
 
  
 Notes for Figure 3: The figures show the risky lending gap (RLG), its capital 
component (CAPCMP) and asset risk component (RISKCMP) for each of the five 
banks using the five-year model parameters  except the book value return of 
developer loans, which is varied.  
  
 Figure 5:  The risky lending gap and its components as a 
function of the total book value of developer loans 
 
 
  
 
Notes of Figure 5: The figures show the risky lending gap (RLG), its capital component 
(CAPCMP), and its asset risk component (RISKCMP) as a function of the book value 
of developer loans for each of the five banks, using the five-year model parameters. 
  
